A distinction between the Copenhagen Interpretation and complementarity is underscored, with the former based on methodological effects (i. e., disturbance) or some time now I have observed colleagues in psychology discussing the possibility of our profession's adopting a principle of complementarity (for recent examples see Hyland & Kirsch, 1988; Kirsch & Hyland, 1987; Snyder, 1988 Snyder, , 1989 . The reasons given for wanting to adopt complementarity stem primarily from the very complexity of our subject matter-human beings-as well as the inability we psychologists have to agree on a common ground on which to base our explanations. I do not think that any psychologist would deny that we have some rather deep schisms in our approaches to the study of human experience. But how would a complementarity principle help resolve or at least promote tolerance for the differences that currently exist? To complement is to fill out or make up for what is lacking in a theoretical explanation of some targeted item of interest.
It was Niels Bohr who first proposed a complementarity principle for physics, and his model is invoked whenever this topic is discussed by psychologists. Sometimes the phrase Copenhagen Interpretation is used in referring to this model. In this article I review the evolution of the complementarity concept in Bohr's writings, show where it is said to function in the theoretical explanations of a physicist, and then present an alternative model of complementarity for psychology-one that I believe would both sharpen our theorizing and promote tolerance for conflicting goals in what we want to theorize about.
It is not unusual to hear or read that historians of science "practically equate the Copenhagen Interpretation and complementarity" (Zukav, 1979, p. 38) . Apparently Niels Bohr would not have agreed with this equation even though he probably contributed to the confounding of the two ideas (see Folse, 1985; Moore, 1966; Murdoch, 1987) . The phrase Copenhagen Interpretation does not appear in Bohr's writings. Strictly speaking, the Copenhagen Interpretation is restricted to a supposed methodological limitation-namely, disturbance (Folse, 1985) . The disturbance thesis holds that the reason subatomic physicists cannot simultaneously measure both the momentum and the position of an electron precisely (i.e., indeterminacy) is because the instruments used in the precise measurement of one of these characteristics necessarily disturb the other characteristic.
When Bohr first presented the complementarity concept in 1927 at a Congress in Como, Italy, he did indeed speak of the physicist's observation as disturbing the atomic system under study. But if indeterminacy were simply a matter of aligning the proper measuring instrument with the object under observation, classical mechanical theory would still be valid at the subatomic level. Measuring devices would now be intruding on and disrupting a mechanical process that could, in principle, be targeted precisely with some alternative, nonintrusive form of measurement. The problem would be strictly methodological, although we could not say what this nonintrusive form of measurement would be like. But what Bohr wanted to convey by his principle of complementarity was that at the subatomic level, physical nature per se can no longer be conceptualized in such Newtonian, mechanistic terms. At the 5th Solvay Conference, held in Brussels later in 1927, Bohr and Einstein had their famous exchange concerning the nature of complementarity. The phrase Copenhagen Interpretation devolves from this congress (Zukav, 1979) . Bohr (1934) was always careful to discuss complementarity in terms of the findings of experimental designs, not in terms of the theoretical formulations preceding such experiments. This is a crucial point. Bohr and Einstein postulated several thought experiments in their exchange; and because there was this focus on quasi-empirical matters, it is easy to see how colleagues could view the Copenhagen Interpretation of Bohr's complementarity principle as involving instrumental intrusions on the data rather than conceptual explanations of the data. But by 1935 Bohr had distanced himself from the disturbance thesis entirely, specifying that complementarity was something other than a problem due to the use of gross measuring devices to capture minute characteristics of physical reality (Folse, 1985) . He began at about this time to speak of a "phenomenal" (p. 156) object of observation. Any one phenomenon could have two complementary aspects in the measurement of its characteristics-as in the wave or particle aspects of light, the momentum or position of the electron, and so on. Hence, in its final formulation, complementarity was understood as a wider frame of reference within which to conceptualize empirical findings (laws of nature, etc.).
Bohr was not endorsing phenomenalism as a theoretical outlook per se (Folse, 1985) . Unlike Immanuel Kant (1781 Kant ( /1952 , who proposed a phenomenal theory in which the mind gave form to all (noumenal) experience at the outset, Bohr's phenomenalism came into play only after an empirical fact had been documented. It was not the predicating assumptions giving life to this fact that concerned Bohr but rather the remarkable discovery that more than one understanding of certain physical facts was not only possible, it was necessary. As Folse observed, "Bohr's profession as a physicist probably blinded him to the possibility that the entire atomic domain which he and his colleagues were attempting to describe by formulating quantum theory was but a construct of their theories" (p. 229). The main thrust of complementarity is thus to replace the singularity of explanation in classical mechanics, not to account for the assumptive differences made by physicists to guide their work. I would like to take up this point in conjunction with the question: Can psychology embrace a Bohrian complementarity?
Theory Versus Method in Complementarity
A distinction between theory and method strikes me as fundamental to an understanding of complementarity. I would define a theory as a "series of two or more constructions (abstractions, concepts, items, images, etc.) which have been hypothesized, assumed, or even factually demonstrated to bear a certain relationship, one to the other" (Rychlak, 1988, p. 520) . A method, on the other hand, is the "means or manner of determining whether a theoretical construct or proposition is [held to be] true or false. . . . Methods are vehicles for the exercise of evidence" (pp. 515-516). There are two broad forms of evidence: (a) procedural evidence, which is based on a coherence theory of truth drawing on plausibility, internal consistency, tautology, face validity, and so on, and (b) validating evidence, which is based on a correspondence theory of truth drawing on an empirical test in which a succession of events is arranged in light of a hypothesis, and a prediction is made to a criterion.
Bohr's challenge was to account for the unexpected regularities that had shown up in the context of experimentation, where validation was being sought. The plausibilities of procedural evidence, which enter into mathematical ratiocinations as well as the design of empirical (and thought) experiments, did not readily accommodate the strange events being observed at the subatomic level of experimentation. These findings were valid; they were predictably reproducible. But they did not make plausible sense. Frank (1957, chaps . 1 and 2) described this failure of plausibility at the subatomic level as a rupture in the chain that had bound scientific to philosophical understanding.
Turning now to psychology, it is clear that we lack a valid experimental finding that is so inexplicable as to require a complementary account of the paradoxical facts after they have been accrued-as in the wave-particle nature of light. This suggests to me that we cannot have a Bohrian complementarity in psychology. I could try to manufacture such a paradox in certain findings within psychology. For example, I might assert that the remarkable role played by awareness in both classical and operant conditioning reflects such a paradox (see Brewer, 1974) . We may claim that people are being shaped by our conditioning devices. But when we take the time to talk with our subjects, to view things from their perspective in the experimental apparatus, we find that conditioning is very unlikely to occur unless the subject involved has a grasp of what is taking place in the sequential apparatus and is willing to go along with what is being suggested there. I have called this a contrasting of the introspective (i. e., first person or subject's) point of view with the extraspective (i. e., third person or experimenter's) point of view concerning what is going on in the experimental design (Rychlak, 1988) . From the experimenter's perspective, subjects are being shaped, and from the subject's perspective, they are cooperating with what is under suggestion (demand) in the experimental design.
Another reflection of such differences in perspective is the work of Jones and Nisbett (1971) . These investigators found that when actors in situations give us their introspective understanding of what is taking place, they invariably claim that the factors in the circumstances facing them are what causes them to behave as they do. On the other hand, observers looking at such actors (which gives us the extraspective outlook) attribute the cause of the actors' behavior to stable personality traits or habitual dispositions to behave in a certain way regardless of circumstances.
Are not such different understandings of the empirical data direct parallels to the paradoxes that Bohr had to deal with in subatomic events? Could we not suggest that a principle of complementarity is required here to present the complete action taking place in such experimentation? I think not. The problem is that we lack the tension of plausibility being stretched in the findings of such experiments. A mechanistic explanation of such findings is easily achieved (e.g., see Dulany, 1974 , on conditioning, or Jones & Nisbett, 1971 , on their findings). Alternatively, I could readily explain these findings in a nonmechanistic or teleological manner (Rychlak, 1988) . There is no sense here of a methodological finding-an "after the experimental fact"-demanding that both mechanist and teleologist accept complementing explanations of the facts.
What is required for a Bohrian complementarity to occur is a clearer explanatory difference of the observed data. To the physicist, when the facts prove light to be a wave function, this is taken as a completely different event than when the facts prove light to consist of particles. Wave and particle are totally different groundings for the theoretical explanations made, hence they describe totally different natural events albeit named as the same physical concept (i.e., light). The implausibility of diverse groundings for the theoretical description of a single concept is what calls for the principle of complementarity. We cannot reduce one theory's grounding (wave) to the other's (particle) or vice versa-yet, there the findings stand! In psychology, we have no such methodological finding popping up to stretch our plausibility (procedural evidence) beyond its customary limits. Indeed, as my examples above suggest, if psychology is to have a principle of complementarity, it will have to function before the methodologically proven fact occurs, as an aspect of the theorizing to be put to test in the first place. Here is where I think some steps can be taken to clarify grounds that do indeed complement each other because they are not reducible to each other.
Complementarity in Psychology: Four Theoretical Groundings
Thanks to the work of people like Thomas Kuhn (1970) and Robert Watson (1967) , we have had a growing appreciation of the importance that predicating paradigms or prescriptions play, not only in framing how we interpret the findings of our experiments in psychology but in framing what we set out to investigate in the first place. Surely no psychologist today would deny that such assumptive influences play a role in his or her theorizing. If we survey current theories in psychology, we are struck by the meaning shared by such concepts as schemata, prototypes, constructs, scripts, plans, and so forth. All such concepts act like Kantian preconceptions or grounds on the basis of which the person behaves-including the psychologist who theorizes, experiments, and interprets the resulting data. Strict positivism, which held that meanings issue exclusively from below, from the preformed substrate of reality, is no longer confidently embraced by the majority of psychologists.
We know full well that when psychologists conduct an experiment, they are necessarily making a preliminary selection as to which grounding they will be using to conceptualize their findings. But the grounds that they may have considered and rejected are not therefore invalid without assuming yet another ground on which to render such a negative evaluation (Rychlak, 1980) . The grounds provide a broad background within which theories are framed and then in turn put to test, limited by a certain logical fallacy.
To reason that if my theory is correct, then the experimental data will array as I predict, in XYZ fashion, and then find that the data do indeed array empirically in XYZ fashion does not permit us to conclude that my theory is necessarily correct. We cannot do so because the line of reasoning here is akin to affirming the consequent of an if-then logical proposition. This is like saying, "If a human being, then a mortal" and affirming that the body standing before us is mortal (i. e., affirm the consequent or second major term of the initial proposition). It would be improper to conclude that this mortal is necessarily a human being because many organisms other than humans are mortal-and could be standing before us. In like fashion, as we already have seen in our examples of the previous section, two theories drawing on different grounding assumptions (e. g., mechanical, teleological) can account for the same XYZ fact pattern. Indeed, more than one theory framed within the same grounding (e. g., two mechanical theories) could account for this pattern. This is not an issue requiring complementarity, of course, because it is an intrinsic limitation of validation and not a paradoxical finding in the use of this form of evidence.
But it is this loss of certainty in validation that seems to have lent fuel to a growing demoralization among certain critics who question the utility of this form of evidence (e.g., see Gergen, 1985, p. 272) . These critics infer from the logical limitations on validation that a psychologist using this method can prove either nothing at all or anything that she or he wants to. It appears that we are in a period of psychology's history when proposals for alternative methods are mushrooming-qualitative, phenomenological, hermeneutic, deconstructive, dialoguebased, narrative-based, and so on. When we look more closely at these supposed methods, we learn that they either rely on some form of validation in any case or are exclusively based on procedural evidence. I have argued in favor of retaining the rigors of validation even as we liberalize theorizing in psychology (Rychlak, 1981 (Rychlak, , 1988 . Procedural evidence tests the plausibility of our theories, but as a science we must advance to the additional "control and prediction" testing of validation. Anything less is anathema to a scientific profession.
So, I would not view these suggestions for different methods as reflecting complementarity. All sciences work within the limitations of validation. This limitation has not prevented scientists from curing polio or putting people on the moon. Actually, psychologists should be delighted with the limitations on positivism, for it means that psychological conceptualization will always play a role in the furthering of knowledge. The conceptualizer, the human being that we study, is central to the generation of all knowledge. This conceptualizer must necessarily affirm some fundamental basis-a grounding-on which to make his or her case. We know today that our grounds are not "out there" in the data but "in here" as assumptive frameworks. This means that the grounds can vary significantly. They may, indeed, reflect implausibility when compared with each other.
If we psychologists can admit that we never have absolutely necessary grounds on which to base our theories, then we will be in a position to see that alternative groundings may be complementary. I think that our history can establish a handful of grounds that have been repeatedly used in psychological theorizing. If this is true, then it should be possible for each psychologist to state what grounding basis he or she is fundamentally affirming in making a formal theoretical statement. No matter how strongly we may feel that a colleague errs in selecting a certain ground on which to base the theoretical explanation under consideration, it is still possible to examine the internal structure and clarity of this account, its instructiveness and relevance for wider issues, and its consistency with empirical evidence. We will no longer be trying to explain away (subsume, reduce, etc.) one ground by another but rather focusing and sharpening the theoretical account being advanced in light of the grounding assumption selected at the outset.
A critic might charge that I favor "anything goes" in the grounding of theoretical explanations. This is not my intention. The complementarity argued for is of this sort: On what meanings are you grounding your theoretical ideas? Are your grounds relevant to what you set out to explain? Are you sure that you know where your assumptive grounding is taking you? How clearly do your theoretical concepts actually rest on the ground that you have selected? Are there any other grounds covertly sneaking in to save the theoretical explanation at crucial points? How consistent are your grounded theories with a large body of empirical evidence? Note that we have here a focus on the theorist's basic assumptions, taking them for what he or she believes them to be. Hopefully psychologists will then focus their critical efforts on the theory being advanced in light of its assumptions, rather than judge it unfairly in light of assumptions that it does not make in the first place-a practice all too common in our discipline at present.
Grounding Assumptions for Psychology's Complementarity
I believe that there are four grounds in psychology on which to base explanations of behavior: Physikos, Bios, Socius, and Logos. These grounds have been woundsingularly or in combination-into all of our theories in psychology. This is not an exhaustive list. Other grounds might be fashioned in the future. But for now I believe that psychology's complementarity should rely on these four grounds of equal stature, each capable of solitary application to any explanation. Complementarity is called for because these grounding assumptions are no more reconcilable than the wave-particle groundings of physics. Once again, to complement involves filling out or making up for what is lacking in a theoretical explanation of some target. As I am now using the term, there is the further suggestion that the grounds for any one theoretical explanation cannot really be mixed because they lend completely different and even paradoxical meanings to the target of interest.
The Physikos ground is taken most directly from physical science, where an effort has been made to explain inanimate events in terms of energic processes, such as gravitation, constancy, and conservation. By a process I mean a discernible, repeatable course of action on the basis of which the targets under description are believed to be patterned so that we recognize them for what they are. A ground cannot be considered a ground unless it has a distinctive process of this sort. It is the process that distinguishes one ground from another. Each process conveys or produces distinctive contents, which are the items targeted for explanation. In physics or astronomy, for example, a basic process is that of gravitation. Some presumed attraction and action at a distance holds the planets in sequentially patterned orbits as they fall though space within force fields. The planets are contents within the gravitational process, targeted for explanation by this process. In psychology, when Clark Hull (1937, p. 2) argued that human behavior is merely a complication of the same factors that go to make up the actions of a raindrop, he was basing his explanation on the Physikos. At the most fundamental assumptive level, he recognized no difference between animate and inanimate substances in motion.
If such a difference is to be drawn, while continuing to base explanations on the physical substance of animate organisms, we move to the Bios grounding. Here we find being advanced processes like genetics, mediation, and organic systems. In an article entitled "What Psychology Is About," Donald Hebb (1974) stated flatly that "Psychology is a biological science" (p. 72). Given this grounding predication, it followed for Hebb that "Free will has a physiological basis" (p. 75), which means that human agency is a content within a biological process. So long as we ignore the animate-inanimate issue, it is difficult to distinguish a Bios from a Physikos concept, which is probably why Hull found it so easy to equate the behaviors of raindrops and people.
If we leave such physical complexities and begin thinking of the person in terms of group relations and cultural influences, we arrive at the Socius grounding. Here, the processes that are invoked include socialization, historicism, and even political collectivism. I would suggest that when Kenneth Gergen (1989) asked us to "avoid reducing the social world to the psychological" (p. 427) and to stress exogenous cultural factors in describing behavior rather than endogenous cognitive factors (Gergen, 1985) , we were witnessing an argument for theories grounded in the Socius.
The final ground I have discerned in psychological theorizing is the Logos, which draws on the patterned order of experience to explain things according to processes like predication, personal construing, or mental acts in the Brentanoan sense. When George Kelly (1955) defined the construing process as involving the framing of how two items are alike and by the same token different from a third (p. 112), he was relying exclusively on a process in the Logos-which brings about cognitive organizations that we call meaning. To mean is to intentionally pattern or simply acknowledge extant organizations of experience that suggest a purpose. The Logos is not to be found in the physical or the social structures of experience-as if it were a content within such processes-but in the ever shifting patterns of meaningful relations that the physical and social structures take on in the conceptual processes of intelligence. Intellect and intelligence take Latin roots from perceiving or gathering relations among and between events, resulting in an understanding of meaningful patterns, enabling free-will choices among them, and so forth. The Logos is fundamental here.
Explain also devolves from the Latin word planare, which means to flatten or make things level. A psychological principle of complementarity will therefore make it clear that a theoretical explanation must be brought down (leveled) to any one of four clear (flat) grounds, each of which has equal status. We are not speaking of four levels of explanation here. The groundings are not to be rank ordered. To complement is not to subsume one ground by another. Zukav (1979) observed that the impact of complementarity on physics was, in effect, "that it does not matter what quantum mechanics is about! The important thing is that it works in all possible experimental situations" (p. 37). I would like to paraphrase this statement by saying that if we accept the four grounds that I have recommended, it will not matter which of these bases we select to build our theory on. So long as what we say is instructive and consistent with the empirical findings relevant to the theoretical grounding per se, we will be practicing psychology.
Also, it will not matter if empirical findings supporting one grounding assumption fail to address explanations in another grounding assumption. The empirical findings in the Bios complement empirical findings in the Logos: they do not replace them. If findings in the Physikos cannot be wound into theoretical accounts based on the Socius, this is not necessarily a strike against the Socius. Of course, if a social theory makes claims about what can happen to people's physical functioning in certain physical climates, then obviously these claims must meet with the findings of theories that have been drawn from and tested in the Physikos and Bios realms. But just because a social theory does not reduce its accounts to biophysical forcesmaking the Socius a content in the Bios or Physikos rather than a ground in its own right-does not mean that it is invalid or unfinished as an explanation. Such reductionism is predicated on a rank ordering of the grounding levels of explanation, with some considered more basic than others (note that this ordering is a Logos hierarchy). Psychological complementarity does away with such reductive requirements.
Sample Problems in Psychology's Groundings
It is not difficult finding examples of problems with the groundings in psychology-the most notorious of which would involve the historical mind-body or, as I would phrase it, the Logos-Bios problem. I have always considered Fechner (Hall, 1912) to be the real father of psychology, because he theorized-albeit with little acceptance from colleagues-that these two spheres of human experience were of equal stature. Helmholtz's influence was to win out in psychology, thanks to Wundt's apparently half-hearted commitment to elementism (see Blumenthal, 1975) , which seeks to reduce the Logos (content) to the Bios (process). This is still the received view in psychology because it seems so plausible that people have brains (Bios) and that they are physical beings (Physikos) with electrochemical actions going on inside them. Who would.be so rash as to ignore such obvious facts in framing purely psychological explanations? It is hard for the reductionist to accept a complementarity in which to avoid Bios accounts in favor of Logos accounts is not thereby to deny the validity of Bios accounts.
I think of Skinner (1974) as an example of someone who did not wish to confound the actuarial measurements of observed behavior with functions presumably going on inside the organism. Skinner always admitted that there were things to be observed and even theorized about inside the black box. But he also realized that he did not observe these things in his work as a behavior analyst. All he observed was a pattern of action that he could measure as it unfolded in the behavior of organisms. It is my belief that Skinner was rejecting efforts to theorize on the basis of the Physikos-Bios in favor of the Logos and Socius. I think he was correct in his stand on this matter. Psychologists continually observe people behaving in some patterned way, only to present their observations in terms of theories postulating all manner of unobserved electrical circuitry-thereby switching instantaneously from the Logos or Socius to the Physikos-Bios. Along with Skinner, I believe that the fundamental basis of the resultant theoretical account rests much more on the former than the latter grounds. Subtle shiftings like this can blind the theorist to significant misrepresentations in the resulting explanation.
A classic example of such misrepresentation is Dollard and Miller's (1950) valiant attempt to bring Freudian theory-in my opinion best suited to Logos groundingunder the aegis of the Physikos-Bios formulations of Hullian learning theory. As a result, whereas Freud had repression pregnant with meaning-with the censoring of meanings-Dollard and Miller interpreted repression as a lack of meaning-producing mediators (i. e., cue-producing responses; Dollard & Miller) . Whereas Freud had the unconscious sphere of cognition even more knowledgeable than the conscious sphere, Dollard and Miller described the unconscious as the unlabeled, hence unknown (stupid) aspects of ongoing cognition and behavior (Dollard & Miller) . Of course, Freud cannot be praised September 1993 • American Psychologist for his theoretical clarity on such matters either. Responding to the Newtonian pressures of his time, he formulated his notoriously confusing and arbitrary libido theory, which can now be seen as an effort to express Logos concerns in Bios fashion (Freud, 1921 (Freud, /1955 .
It should not be thought that disagreements among theoretical perspectives in psychology always occur across groundings. It is possible to have alternative theoretical perspectives share a common grounding. When Titchener (1898) drew the structuralist-functionalist distinction, he was attacking Logos theorists like Brentano, who he felt too readily succumbed to unscientific teleological descriptions. Titchener was drawing a line separating groundings, for he wanted all psychological accounts to be grounded in the Bios. He was answered by Angell (1907) , who favored an interpretation of functionalism rooted not in the Logos but in the same Bios that Titchener favored. Because these shifting grounds were never elucidated, the original issue raised by the structuralismfunctionalism debate-attacking teleological theory-was lost to history (see Rychlak, 1988) . Even so, there was a rift between these two theoretical schools sharing a common ground.
A similar theoretical disagreement occurred when Hull (1943) objected to Tolman's (1932 Tolman's ( /1967 use of purpose, substituting the fractional antedating goal response as an explanation of such anticipatory behaviors. Both of these theorists were framing explanations at the Bios level, although in truth it might be argued that Tolman permitted the Logos to ground his accounts at crucial points-a fact that Hull seems to have sensed. Nevertheless, it is still true that theorists can disagree even though they have accepted common groundings for their explanations. What complementarity accomplishes here is to keep all grounding assumptions clearly above board, sharpening the resulting explanation.
A more recent example of the confusion that can arise in grounding explanations is Sherif's (1987) Complementarity would suggest the following approach to resolve this confusion: Before a psychologist undertakes the study of sex, he or she should have clearly in mind precisely on what ground the theoretical account will rest. Although a challenging task, try to stay within one grounding realm in any one theoretical account. Make this theoretical grounding explicit in the write-up to follow, so that as colleagues read the results of an experiment testing some aspect of sex, they can frame their understanding accordingly. Colleagues would then be expected to acknowledge and take seriously the ground under study, rather than dismissing it out of hand and accounting for the experimental data in terms of their own pet ground.
The focus of criticism should be on how instructive the ground initially selected proves to be in the theory, collection of data, and analysis that follows from it.
Returning to the mind-body problem a century after Fechner, we find a modern brain researcher like Granit (1977) suggesting that the central nervous system must be understood in terms of purpose and that purpose is a point of view rather than a physical property of the brain. I would suggest that points of view are best understood as Logos rather than Bios conceptions. The latter conceptions need not be mixed among the former in order to say something about purpose. Of course, the two grounds are in fact regularly mixed. For example, after equating the logic of infant behavior with predictable input-output relations, T. G. R. Bower (1989) observed that "The explanation of input-output relations in terms of intervening logical structures has been going on for a long time" (p. 151). Unfortunately this is true. But on such an account, logical structures are said to arise without a Logos process framing them into existence-acting in turn as input mediators in a Bios-Physikos cybernetic process. Once again, the Logos is being framed here as a content in the Bios, even though there is not one scintilla of evidence to suggest that the latter can influence the logical patterning of the former in any way (see Penfield, 1975) .
Sometimes a theorist will combine two grounds, only to later drop one without significantly altering his or her fundamental position. This represents excellent evidence for the likelihood that the theorist was really not relying on the dropped ground in the first place and that an indepth analysis of the original theory in question would have established this fact. As one recent example of this phenomenon, Anderson (1983) initially offered the following argument to support his theory of cognitive activation:
There are numerous reasons for believing in a spreading activation mechanism. One is that it corresponds to our understandings of neurophysiology. The neurons and their connections can be thought of as a network. The rate of firing of a neuron can be thought of as the level of activation.. . . The general set of "neurophysiological hunches" that we possess is probably an important consideration in many people's acceptance of spreading activation, (p. 86) In a book published seven years later, Anderson (1990) reversed his position and suggested that such paralleling of activated networks with brain structures was misguided; for the indefinite future, cognitive psychologists should not be pressured into "a premature insistence on neural fidelity" (p. 13) in their theorizing (for a similar attitude, see Watkins, 1990) .
The gist of Anderson's new position is that we are not certain what the ultimate brain-processing theory is going to be (surely modern conflict theories of such processing do not support network models; see Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 243) , that different arrangements of the neural-like elements produce the same phenomena and vice versa, and that we can carry on our psychological studies without a one-to-one matching of network models to neuronal brain patterns in any case. All pretense of Bios grounding is lost at this point. The implied question becomes: If not the Bios, then what ground is in fact underwriting Anderson's network theory of activation? I think it would represent a significant theoretical advance to get a clear answer to this question.
There is probably no area of study in which groundings are more debated than that of emotion. Zajonc and Mclntosh (1992) have cautioned that one should not commit to a theory of emotion that claims universal validity because there are so many assumptive biases active in this area of study, such as focusing exclusively on biological or cultural influences. If we followed a principle of complementarity, there would be no need to seek a universal theory in the first place. The only question we would address is, How well do theorists in the area of emotion who rely exclusively on the Bios (e.g., Papez, 1937) convey their assumptive bias, as compared with those who rely exclusively on the Socius (e.g., Lutz, 1986) ? And if it were impossible to bring such grounds together into a single theory, then we would appreciate that the reason this is the case is because different groundings lend different meanings to the target in question, meanings that cannot ever be welded together. What we should be after here is the best possible theory within the strictures of the ground selected.
As I noted earlier, according to complementarity it does not matter what the real nature of an emotion is. What matters is the clarity of the explanation in relation to the targeted experimental data. This clarity is not always achieved. As a case in point, in his network theory explanation of mood state-dependent learning, G. H. Bower (1981) relied on a Bios ground, which, as we have noted, meshes nicely with the Physikos. This compatibility enabled Bower to note that "electrical energy [Physikos] corresponds to activation [Bios]" (p. 134). But he also described the basic unit of thought as the "proposition," which presumably has meaningful subject and predicate terms linked together by associative ties. I would argue that predication is best thought of as a process in the Logos (Rychlak, 1991) . Space considerations do not allow me to analyze Bower's proposition concept in the necessary detail, but I think much of his account draws on the Logos only to be inappropriately recast into the Bios-Physikos. Even if I were wrong in this suggestion and could not deliver on this Skinnerian critique, the effort expended in this regard could only help to clarify the theory under scrutiny-where, at the very least, we have the possible confounding of explanatory grounds.
Just as we accept a colleague's operational definition of some concept preliminary to his or her gathering data in an experiment, so too can we accept in principle the single (i. e., nonconfounded) ground selected by a colleague to account theoretically for some targeted area of interest. We then look at the resultant analysis and explanation in terms of the chosen ground. If we find a confusion of grounds mixing into the account, this can be pointed out, showing if possible what the actual or most fundamental grounding comes down to in the explanation. But if there is a clear analysis and explanation, no matter how we might personally prefer to select another grounding, it is not acceptable practice on a complementarity principle to reject or ignore the account in question. At a metatheoretical level we may debate the grounds to be used generally in psychology and unabashedly commit to our favorite. But we should not hit each other over the head with such biases during the everyday efforts we put into building a scientific discipline. It seems to me that this tolerance of a colleague's ground would be a nice first step toward the unification of psychology that is being sought today by many psychologists (see, e.g., Staats, 1991) . We unify through an appreciation of the complementary diversity of our groundings.
Questions Raised by Psychological Complementarity
I have had several questions raised by colleagues concerning the suggested adoption of a psychological complementarity. Here are a half dozen typical examples and a brief reply.
1. Won't we always be using all four of these grounds no matter what we actually write up to explain things?
The important point concerning complementarity is not how many grounds we may consider informally but how the formal write-up is framed. This final stand is what we want to analyze precisely and specifically. I am frankly dubious about how much actual mixing of grounds goes on in the core explanation, the basic point of view. As in the example from Anderson (1983) quoted earlier, most of the mixing probably occurs at ancillary points that are not of crucial relevance to the account in question. I suggest that we stop worrying about how the grounds might or might not fit together. Work on one ground; work on four grounds. Sharpen your thinking accordingly when you zero in on the theoretical explanation of your target, but limit any one write-up to one ground. Our theoretical accounts become too muddled when we begin to slip and slide between groundings.
2. Doesn't it follow that the more grounds used, the richer the theoretical account will be?
No, I no longer believe this to be true. Most of the time, the account becomes more obscure. I think that the intent of reductionism, which sought to bring one ground down to another-the former then being understood as a content of the latter-was to simplify explanation. All sciences aim at simplifying explanations. What Bohr faced up to was the fact that we can simplify theories down to more than one ground. There is plenty of work remaining, simplifying explanations in terms of just one ground. There will always be some good and bad theorizing going on within any one of the groundings. I believe that when a theorist is mixing two or more grounds into the same account-as levels of explanation, for example-it will be relatively easy to show which of these assumptions is contributing the crucial meaning to the finished product.
3. Don't the facts or experimental results have something to say about what ground should be used to account for them? Will all four of these groundings stand up equally well to an empirical test?
Clearly, when we approach the explanation of a target (i.e., the item, event, etc., under study), the relevance of one grounding or another is suggested in the very facts that our observations record. There is always a precedent framework, a predication that lends the meaning to what we select as an area of study in the first place. But, as in the study of the mentally disadvantaged, for example, there is often great plausibility (procedural evidence) in applying biological conceptions to our explanation of such clinical syndromes. Similarly, in theorizing about how it is that clinicians as thinkers frame their hypotheses concerning syndromes-not to mention any other form of hypothesis testing-a logical analysis seems plausible. Why not therefore rely on Bios conceptions in the former context and Logos conceptions in the latter context? The same psychologist could do this without feeling inconsistent. This is not traditional eclecticism because we are not combining grounds into the same account. The point is that we remain scientists, that we seek validation whenever called on to advance evidence for our line of theorizing. But as facts never truly speak for themselves (recall the affirming-the-consequent fallacy), there is a vital role to be played here by purely theoretical analysis, which always brings in the matter of grounds.
The related question about whether or not all four groundings will stand up equally to empirical testing is due to a misunderstanding in the role that a ground plays. It is true that grounds may be thought of as highly abstract meta-theoretical positions, but as such widely encompassing predications, they are not precisely under empirical testing in the data collection of an experiment. They frame the theory that predicts and seeks support from these data, but the grounds are never under direct test by the data. Thus, if human behavior is under empirical study, any evidentiary data (i. e., any lawful regularity in such behavior) would be targeted by all four of our groundings at the same time. The affirming-the-consequent fallacy involves the theory under a certain grounding being put to empirical test. If such a theory continually lacks support, it will be discarded in time, but the theorist would usually frame an alternative explanation under the same grounding. Alternatively, the theorist might look at the disconfirming data from a theory framed by a different grounding. Strictly speaking, data collections are one step removed from the grounds involved.
4. Aren't you trying to gain acceptance for "soft" psychology in your complementarity model? Isn't the Logos what soft psychologists want to use in their explanations?
Although I suspect that those who are called soft psychologists might prefer to use the Logos to ground their explanations, I am put off by this hard-soft labeling of theoretical grounds. As far as I am concerned, the hard or tough-minded approach in psychology is to be found in the context of method (proof, experimental design, etc.) and not in the context of theoretical explanation. A hard scientific method that is objective can entertain theoretical hypotheses drawing on any of our four groundings. The grounds are selected on the basis of procedural evidence, of course, but this is true of all assumptive beliefs including those of mathematics. Plausibility is what gets us all going. However, if the method dictates that only Physikos and Bios groundings are suitable to it-which would itself be a bias drawn from procedural evidence-then although it may be hard, it is the very opposite of objective. A truly scientific method should never dictate the theories put to it. And if it is true that theories based on all four groundings may be subjected to validation, then the Logos form of theory is no more soft than any other type of explanation. As I noted earlier, the kind of soft psychology that worries me is the one that rejects validating evidence in favor of tests based exclusively on procedural evidence. I want to use the Logos in my theorizing but also want to use our traditional method of validation.
5. What do you have against theoretical integration? Isn't this the aim of the unity of the sciences, to bring all explanations under one theoretical umbrella?
I have nothing against theoretical integration when it works. But I have come to the regrettable conclusion that this aim for theoretical unity, which is no longer clung to with conviction in other sciences, has paradoxically become a source of disunity in psychology. I would argue that the so-called unity achieved in the natural sciences occurred because of the compatibility that we have seen between the Physikos and the Bios, which easily meld into each other when the question of life (animated action) is not at issue. Our fellow scientists are fully cognizant of the importance of the Logos and Socius as complements to the traditional groundings of the Physikos and Bios. Physicists today refer to themselves as "participators" (Zukav, 1979, p. 29) in their work. I believe that such recognition as, indeed, the recognition by Bohr of complementarity itself, requires explanation in terms of a Logos realm. What such scientists have to offer as participators is their framing assumptions, their points of view, and their logical ordering of the material under study.
The physical scientists are not going to be upset if some of us in psychology base our explanations solely on a Logos grounding. The theoretical physicist, David Bohm (1985) , has postulated an "implicate order" (p. 14) that functions both in subatomic fields and in generating meanings in human thought. The theoretical biochemist, Rupert Sheldrake (1989) , has introduced a related notion of "morphic fields" (p. 198) that lend uniform behavioral patternings to entire species of animals. Such conceptions are consistent with Logos explanations.
6. Isn't it likely that even though we require different groundings today, when we learn more about the various groundings in the future we should be able to bring all of our theories together on a "basic" grounding? Is this not our real goal in psychology?
This "wait until tomorrow" reassurance strikes me as an effort to retain the status quo of reductive explanation. I do not accept the view that simply because we may frame complementary accounts of behavior we are in some kind of preparadigmatic stage to be rectified in time (Kuhn, 1970) . I say there is no tomorrow. We need not apologize for the fact that the subject matter of our science is rich enough to invite more than one theoretical grounding. I cannot, of course, deny that maybe someday one grounding will suffice for all that there is in psychology. I doubt this very much. But if the goal of psychologists is to adopt complementarity as an intermediate step, until such time as a single grounding can account for all there is to be said about human beings, then I say this is no real complementarity at all. This would be an insincere strategy carrying no weight.
Conclusion
I believe that a more open and equal atmosphere is likely to develop in psychology when we all realize that although we are participators in the same endeavor, we are relying on complementary groundings for the knowledge we seek. One person's explanatory gain is therefore not the other's loss. We should encourage and take satisfaction in each other's new insights given the grounds selected. As long as a colleague's chosen grounding matches the theoretical explanation of the empirical data to follow, this will be seen as an advance in knowledge-tentatively held, as in all science. I think that a growing tolerance could be the result. Psychologists have not been noted for their tolerance of each other's point of view.
I also believe that a clearer role will emerge for those psychologists who are not especially drawn to the conducting of research but who have skills in the analysis of theoretical claims. Such psychologists will play an important role in working out the grounding assumptions, the internal consistency of the resulting theory, and the legitimacy of claiming certain research findings as supporting the theory in question. More psychologists must devote themselves to such epistemological efforts. I only hope that we can keep intact our traditional method of control-and-prediction to a criterion. This method of validation enables hypotheses to be formulated and tested on the basis of all four groundings. It is this methodological tie alone that binds us to the family of sciences.
Thus, contrary to the Bohrian model, the complementarity I propose enters at the formulative point of a scientific investigation, even before experiments are framed. As psychologists, we know a little about how people cognize, and everything we have learned to date suggests that framing understanding in terms of founding assumptions does occur in human theorizing. It is time for psychology to broaden its base by recognizing and clarifying the grounding assumptions that its proponents have been using for over a century. There is a good chance that we will enjoy scholarly benefits and promote unity in the profession as well.
